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Introduction 
In On Metaphor, Wayne Booth argues that, “Criticism of metaphoric worlds, or 
visions, [represents] one clear and important – perhaps the clearest and most 
important – instance of a general human project of improving life by criticizing it.”2 
Given the radical extent to which genomics may affect the “general human project”, 
our aim to consider its metaphors would thus be one of the higher aims to which we 
can aspire. While some still underestimate the performativity of language – and 
metaphor, specifically – too many scholars from too many fields have drawn attention 
to its importance for us to ignore.3 The metaphors we use to conceptualize genomics 
today will partly come to define humanity in the future. 
 
Booth’s argument focuses on how we might evaluate individual metaphors: good 
metaphors are supposed to be active, concise, accommodated to the audience, and 
constructive of the speaker’s ethos, although he clearly demonstrates the challenges of 
applying these standard rhetorical judgments. Rather than focusing on such issues, 
however, I wish to consider a related tension. If critics wish to apply Booth's 
evaluative criteria to scientific metaphors, what should their objective be? In short, 
should we seek a single, best metaphor or a plurality of alternative metaphors? And if 
the latter, how many? 
 
My argument will be that we need to find an intermediate level of metaphoric 
plurality. When there are too few metaphors, exemplified by the search for a single 
metaphor, inquiry tends to become too parochial, blind to what lies outside its 
metaphoric vision.4 I will refer to this as unfruitful fiction. As we add metaphors to 
our repertoire, we obtain a friction between alternatives that is fruitful. But, when 
there are too many metaphors, inquiry tends to become stymied by diversity, a 
diversity that includes too many uncritical elements and which leads to an unfruitful 
friction. It seems that criticism is essential, although not too much criticism. We seek 
a middle ground where there is enough diversity that we avoid unfruitful fiction yet at 
the same time provide a fruitful friction between alternative perspectives. 
 
I will sketch this argument from both scientific (epistemic) and social sides because 
metaphors may be appropriate for different reasons in these contrasting domains of 
use. Following Wittgenstein, we may view metaphors in these domains as tools 
serving various needs and purposes. Though I will discuss epistemic and social uses 
separately at first, I will increasingly present a view that questions our capacity to 
isolate them from one another.5 The general question then concerns the conditions 
under which we should weed metaphors as opposed to cultivate plurality. 
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Plurality in genomic science 
I'd like first to examine the ongoing metaphoric shift within genomic science. In the 
late twentieth century, scientists tended to rely upon the ‘blueprint’ metaphor to 
understand and describe genes and gene action, and an academic cottage industry built 
up to critique this metaphor because of its potential social implication.6 I would argue 
that this initial moment where we critically evaluate a particular metaphor needs to be 
followed by another and equally important one, the provision of alternatives that in 
themselves may provide a form of critique of the prevailing metaphor.7 Recently, the 
genomic revolution has spawned just such an investigation of alternative metaphors 
that provide a more fitting epistemic basis for the genomic revolution and its 
subtleties. While there are numerous examples, I focus on a discussion by the 
esteemed geneticist John Avise in the pages of Science, because of its rich examples 
and what it reveals about how scientists themselves think about metaphors.8 While I 
cannot claim that he is representative, he is certainly outspoken.  
 
In his paper, Avise contrasts the relative rarity of traditional “good-citizen” genes 
found by the Human Genome Project with the “astonishing collection of noncoding 
regions, regulatory modules, deadbeat pseudogenes, legions of repetitive elements, 
and hosts of oft-shifty, self-interested nomads, renegades, and immigrants.” He 
further called for “new and evocative metaphors” that are “both entertaining and 
research-stimulating,” and presented a range of options not limited to those above, but 
also including wilderness, motley crews, vagabonds, hordes, freeloaders, tacticians, 
renegades, deadbeats, ramblers, foreigners, parasites, and “great armies of repetitive 
elements – some with hundreds of thousands of like-uniformed members.”  
 
To explain this metaphorical flurry, we might turn to the philosopher Thomas Kuhn, 
who proposed that when scientists are taken in by a particular paradigm they merely 
commit themselves to the puzzle-solving that comprises what he called "normal” 
science.9 Such normal science depends in part on entrenched linguistic resources. 
Kuhn further proposed that paradigms may be overthrown during a revolution caused 
by the increasing weight of anomalies mainly internal to science. When this happens, 
as in the case at hand, alternative metaphors contribute to a rejigging of scientific 
inquiry. Reflecting on his panoply of alternative metaphors, Avise acknowledges, 
“Metaphors can and should evolve to accommodate new findings.” We are living in a 
fertile time because we are dismantling the old way of understanding genes – noting 
that some philosophers predict the demise of the very concept of “gene”10 – and 
searching through our everyday language for metaphoric resources that can aid 
inquiry. 
 
However, normal science beckons, and Avise capitulates – and, I would argue, too 
quickly. While he recognizes that “no one metaphor is likely to be informative in all 
respects”, he concludes his paper with the recommendation that “some new 
perspective that views the genome as an interactive community of evolving loci may 
be especially useful and stimulating at this time”. Within a single paper we have gone 
from critique, to proliferation, to implicit advocacy for a new perspective, rather than 
maintaining a plurality of perspectives. Avise implicitly calls for the resumption of 
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normal science within the context of a metaphorical monoculture, one consistent with 
an implicit realist view of the world. In this context, it makes sense to narrow down to 
a single metaphor in order to focus inquiry, but Avise does not provide any strong 
reasoning for choosing this metaphor. There are options, each leading in a slightly 
different direction. 
 
There are multiple benefits to maintaining more of the metaphoric plurality presented 
in his paper. Primarily, a single metaphor cannot capture a phenomenon in its entirely, 
for every metaphor hides some elements of a comparison while accenting others 
(which Avise recognizes). Diverse metaphors are vital because they provide varied 
perspectives. Psychologist William James, for example, maintained an “ensemble” of 
metaphors to characterize human psychology.11 Metaphors can serve different 
purposes within a research paradigm: for empirical or more theoretical investigations, 
or for maintaining inquiry at the boundary of the paradigm. Thinking ecologically, 
what role might there be for primary producer metaphors versus carnivore and 
detritivore metaphors? Perhaps “producer” metaphors elicit other metaphors or new 
ideas, whereas “carnivorous” metaphors swallow up alternatives, and “detritivorous” 
metaphors absorb meanings from elsewhere (even outside of the science in question).  
 
This argument, then, rejects a realist view of the world. It denies that a single 
metaphor could ever model or capture reality in its entirety, although multiple 
metaphors can provide a more complete picture. While scientists might accept this 
claim for the early stages of inquiry in a field or during a transformative phase, as 
described above for recent genomics, they might still tend to believe that it is 
ultimately better to select a single, best-supported metaphor. And yet, as Kuhn once 
asked, “Does it obviously make better sense to speak of accommodating language to 
the world than of accommodating the world to language?”12 If metaphors help to 
create a world, then a single metaphor provides only partial understanding at the 
intersection between the impressions highlighted by divergent metaphors. Multiple 
metaphors may thus reduce the inclination to attach truth to our metaphors. Donald 
Schön, for example, emphasizes the importance of being able to “attend to and 
describe the dissimilarities as well as the similarities between A and B”. Such a 
process allows us to benefit from the Rashomon effect produced by several metaphors 
because “such a multiplicity of conflicting stories about the situation makes it 
dramatically apparent that we are dealing not with ‘reality’ but with various ways of 
making sense of a reality.”13 This is not a nefarious form of anything goes. Katherine 
Hayles, for example, argues that such scientific metaphors must still be constrained by 
empirical findings.14  
 
Diverse metaphors thereby act as a prophylactic against reification. Single metaphors 
are all too easily entrenched, at which point they become less open to reflective 
critique. Not only does a single metaphor highlight only some aspects of a 
phenomenon, but it can actually divert our attention from its shortcomings and thus 
from alternative perspectives. While it might appear that the blueprint metaphor was a 
fruitful fiction, rather than an unfruitful one, that is only narrowly true because its 
successes in a certain epistemic realm may have delayed questions about its wider 
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applicability. As Avise observes, “The metaphor of the genome as a well-crafted 
blueprint or a finely tuned machine may have blinded many biologists to genomic 
imperfections attributable to phylogenetic constraints and evolutionary-genetic trade-
offs.” It has taken a long time to escape the pull of this metaphor, an escape that might 
have happened more easily if other metaphors had been explored continuously. 
 
More generally, alternative metaphors help to highlight the limits of a research 
paradigm. According to Kuhn, “A paradigm, can … even insulate the community 
from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, 
because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the 
paradigm supplies.”15 A rich set of metaphors may lessen this tendency to look 
through one metaphoric window on the world. Scott Allison and colleagues, for 
example, review the alternative metaphors used in social dilemma research and note 
that the triple metaphor of a “prisoner’s dilemma game” has become “so deeply 
entrenched in the scientific lexicon that most scientists are largely unconscious of its 
metaphorical origins.”16 But they also review the benefits that might accrue from 
thinking in terms of one or more of the 45 alternative metaphors that have been used 
within this area of research. Diverse metaphors may expand rather than contract the 
bounds of scientific inquiry. 
Plurality in the social realm 
In contrast to Avise, who focuses mainly on epistemic issues, sociologist Dorothy 
Nelkin presents a critical review of the social dimensions and implications of genomic 
metaphors. For example, she demonstrates metaphoric plurality in the media in the 
form of commercial, essentialist, fatalistic, and religious metaphoric clusters, and then 
focuses on their social and moral implications. Her view is more constructivist than 
Avise’s, recognizing as it does that, “The apparent precision of such reference works 
tends to obscure the interests and priorities that, in fact, have shaped them.”17 She 
would probably remark that Avise’s contrast between “good-citizen” genes with 
deadbeats or “shifty” nomads, renegades and immigrants certainly lends itself to 
moral sentiments. Furthermore, the apparent diversity of Avise’s metaphors may in 
fact obscure an underlying ideological undercurrent whereby genes are understood as 
human social collectives.18 In raising such questions, Nelkin’s work serves as an 
important reminder that we cannot just appeal to scientists’ intuitions about 
metaphoric fertility, but must simultaneously address broader questions related to the 
ideologies entailed by particular metaphors. 
 
Numerous critics have demonstrated how scientific metaphors may be a cover for 
ideology. Based on his review of this issue, for example, developmental biologist 
Scott Gilbert concludes, “Humanity must be made safe from metaphor,” since “our 
uncritical use of [metaphors] may constrict our freedom and the freedom of others … 
if we are unaware of these metaphors, we risk being imprisoned by them.”19 A 
particular challenge is that metaphors carry not only facts, but implicit values.20 
Thereby, metaphors convert “is” into “ought,” made all the more weighty by the 
authority vested in scientific pronouncements. As observed by Nancy Stepan, in her 
investigation of how women’s “deficient” brains were in nineteenth century scientific 
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studies considered analogous to those of “lower” races, “The tendency for metaphors 
to become dogmatic and to be seen as literally true and nonmetaphoric is particularly 
strong in science because of the identification of the language of science with the 
language of objectivity and reality.”21 In this context, the apparent “truth” of scientific 
metaphors may squelch open deliberation about alternatives in the marketplace of 
ideas.  
 
Furthermore, if alternative metaphors represent alternative value systems and social 
ideals, scientists promoting one or the other are promoting an associated ideology, 
especially given their authoritative voice within society (for example, in the realm of 
genomics). Nelkin, for example, has elsewhere drawn attention to cases where 
scientists actively promote particular metaphors.22 Given scientific authority in 
modern society, it is questionable whether this is appropriate, especially as there is a 
tendency to promote a metaphor earlier than the evidence justifies. While the media is 
partly responsible, and typically blamed, scientists themselves often play a role. For 
example, scientists have branded their attempt to develop species-specific genetic 
markers as “DNA barcoding,” despite questions about both its empirical accuracy and 
suggestive social overtones.23 
 
It is in such cases that a metaphor may transmogrify into an unfruitful fiction in the 
social realm. But by attending carefully to metaphors, “The glide from facts to 
recommendations no longer seems graceful or obvious.”24 In particular, we need to 
assess metaphoric values in the same way we assess any potentially inflammatory or 
harmful remarks, such as racist and sexist ones. We can certainly imagine metaphors 
that would be broadly unpalatable because of implied support for the ideology of vile 
regimes, dictators or murderous plunderers. These may represent extremes, but we 
need to maintain our critical faculties about the potential misuse of various metaphors 
in terms of the conclusions that may be drawn from them, even if mistakenly. While 
Celeste Condit has convincingly shown that we cannot simply assume unfruitful 
extrapolations from particular metaphors (such as deterministic and/or discriminatory 
interpretations of the “blueprint” metaphor), and reminded us that metaphors can be 
attributed too much causal power,25 that is not a carte blanche for all and any 
metaphors.  
 
Metaphoric plurality also prevents univocal authority. As more metaphors circulate, 
more diverse perspectives on a phenomenon will be represented, not only in terms of 
our approaches to a phenomenon, but also in terms of representing diverse values and 
interests within society. Since each metaphor highlights certain elements while veiling 
others, the contact and interplay between different metaphors provides a more 
encompassing vision, a fruitful friction. For this to occur, however, we require a 
revised view of science communication. The outmoded ‘deficit model’ contributes to 
the myth that science is too difficult for most people to understand and that the best 
they can hope for is a simplifying metaphor. In some contexts, this is an appropriate 
model and scientists do need to select metaphors that allow the genomic revolution to 
be more accessible to outsiders, but too often this approach borders on paternalism 
and ignores how scientists require metaphors from everyday language just as much as 
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non-scientists. Both scientists and non-scientists will benefit from discussion of 
diverse metaphors, discussion that will necessitate inquiry about both facts and values.  
 
In particular, some metaphors may implicitly promote a particular worldview, 
especially if they are unconscious, close to our Weltanschauung, and therefore 
unnoticed. When scientific authorities use a metaphor, this may imply that the 
discussion is closed, when in fact this may not be the case. Let me provide an 
example. The National Geographic Society currently funds the Genographic Project, 
‘A landmark study of the human journey’,26 which samples DNA from diverse 
peoples around the world in order to compile a complete picture of human history. 
Representative tribes are encouraged to contribute their DNA, and afterwards they are 
given the “story of their DNA” and of their lives, concerning their origin and where 
their peoples have come from. Given the success of the program, some people are 
clearly interested in obtaining such a story. The challenge, however, is whether this 
story is compelling given the technological problems it faces. Although the project 
has received extensive ethics approval, there are nonetheless questions about the risks 
posed by incorrect stories. More important in the current context, this story is driven 
by particular metaphors, especially the notion of human history as a journey. While 
this metaphor is being used to promote the vision that we are all one beneath surface 
appearances, it neglects the diversity of alternative life stories held by people around 
the world and raises questions about the relation between this, new knowledge, and 
the old. Would we be better served by a story that reveres and celebrates the diverse 
life stories that are actually told? In fact, Wikipedia reports that: 
 
Shortly after the announcement of the Genographic project in April 
2005, the Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism (IPCB), 
released a statement protesting about the project, its connections 
with the Human Genome Project, and called for a boycott of IBM, 
Gateway Computers, and National Geographic. Around May 2006, 
the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII) recommended suspending the project. Concerns were that 
the knowledge gleaned from the research could clash with long held 
beliefs leading to the destruction of their culture. They also feared 
that it could endanger land rights and other benefits.27 
 
While some tribes have refused to participate on such grounds, many others have 
contributed. The question remains whether a univocal journey metaphor is truly 
appropriate for all people.  
Concluding thoughts 
I have sketched an argument for the benefits of metaphoric plurality, but a critical 
counterpoint is that metaphoric choices must be made within a more inclusive social 
context rather than by scientists alone, an argument developed elsewhere.28 Our 
ability to control metaphors is limited because of the multiplicity of their sites of 
origin and the complexity of their circulation at the science-society interface. To 
conceptualize this, it may be helpful to think of them through an analogy with 




9          Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2009, Vol.5, No.3 pp.20-28 
 
_____________    
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.3 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network.  
 
26
Evolutionary ecology studies how organisms evolve and adapt in 
interaction with their environments, or more radically, how 
organisms co-evolve with the environments. The evolutionary 
ecology of metaphor would similarly study how metaphors adapt, 
change and co-evolve in contextual use.29  
 
This perspective draws attention to both the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of 
metaphors; that is, that they occur in a context at each point in time, but that context 
as well as their “fit” to it changes over time.  
 
Scientists have the greatest flexibility for choosing metaphors at those instances where 
new ones are being considered. Yet this is also where there is a tendency to be 
constrained by an overworked set of candidate source domains. For example, Avise 
draws heavily on a few standard domains, including personification (of genes) as well 
as militaristic imagery. This is an area where open deliberation among those with 
differing backgrounds, both expert and non-expert, would contribute to the search for 
more effective and novel imagery. While scientists typically frame novel metaphors, 
perhaps creating “one-shot” promotional metaphors that narrow the ensuing 
discussion, and then society deals with its implications, we might instead imagine 
earlier engagement between scientists and society.  
 
We face a contrasting situation for ensconced metaphors. While there is a similar need 
for dialogue about what particular metaphors might highlight and hide, there is less 
capacity for adjustment here. Nonetheless, there may be instances where the 
shortcomings of particular past choices become apparent and where there are 
initiatives to shift our metaphors. It may be that critiques of this sort will always 
remain on the fringe of the dominant discourse, but they must nonetheless be 
encouraged. In so doing, participants may discover wholly new perspectives on what 
had formerly been a narrowly constrained vision. We have to ensure that scientists are 
not just closed to alternatives, as everyday citizens may well have sensitivities and ask 
questions they do not, questions that may have important implications either in the 
realm of scientific fertility or social consequence. 
 
If we wish to intervene with regard to certain metaphors we face challenges whether 
we are doing so prospectively or retrospectively. In particular, metaphors are entirely 
dependent on context, and we cannot predict future contexts. We are limited, 
therefore, to making the best approximations that we can. It is perhaps the democratic 
process that can assist us in deciding if and when to intervene, even though there are 
very real issues about the extent to which we can intervene in the dynamics of 
complex metaphoric systems. This is all the more reason to take care with those that 
we have and with new ones that we propose. Criticism of metaphoric worlds, as 
Booth describes it, remains a critical task, but will be abetted by maintaining an 
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